Abstract-In the critical infrastructure domain, there exist two distinct players, i.e., attackers and defenders, with contradictory strategies to achieve their winnings. This paper proposes a gametheoretic approach to capture the plausible attack-defense dynamics for power transmission grids in a controlled environment. The stratagems of attackers and defenders can be modeled with unique attributes of their motives and emergency responses. The behaviors of attackers include observation and disruptive actions that can disturb operation while defenders can establish multiple levels of defense with remedial actions for risk mitigation. With an assumption of complete information, the defenders can minimize expected loss of load and generator tripping with load generation adjustment based on current conditions. The attackers, which represent the other force, can maximize their payoff by deploying persistent agents to target on the specific points within a power operation network. The boundary between these two, referred as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, is proposed in the dynamic game model. This model initiates an original infinite game tree that is converted into a finite structure, which is solved using a backward induction approach with multiple scenario validations.
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NOMENCLATURE

Indices and Sets
B i,i
Electrical susceptance of line i − i .
D t,i
Load demand of bus i at t. b t,k ,j,g Binary variable, denoting whether generator g is tripped or not in successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t. V 
Min/max limits of voltages of bus i. D t,k ,j,i
Energized load of bus i in successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t. p t,r,j Probability that cyber protection system r is compromised under intrusion scenario j at t. Pr t,k ,j Probability of successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t. P
P G t,k ,j
Tripped generators in successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t. P t,g Generation power of generator g at t .
Generation power of generator g in successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t. P
L t,i,i
Power from bus i to bus i at t. P
Power from bus i to bus i in successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t.
V t,i
Voltage of bus i at t.
Voltage of bus i in successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t.
Phase angles of buses i and i at t. θ t,k ,j,i , θ t,k ,j,i Phase angles of buses i and i in successful attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at t.
Function of cost caused by conducting cyberattacks as duration of cyberattacks.
Function of probability p t,r,j as duration of cyberattacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
P
OWER automation, as an integral part of the cyber-physical systems (CPS) framework, has transformed the operational business of critical infrastructure with information communication technologies. The quasi-periodic interactions have a profound impact on the energy sector with revolutionary sensors for monitoring and control of the physical power systems. Over the past decade, there has been tremendous progress made to advance system adaptability with technological and computational algorithms [1] , [2] . While the technologies can significantly improve the resilience of the integrated systems, the CPS security has become an important subject of research study and development due to the growing number of cyberattacks on power grids in recent years [3] - [5] .
Cyberwarfare has reached an unprecedented expansion of the global information territory, both in public and private networks. Although the remote access of power networks is strictly limited, it is evident that the vulnerabilities of an integrated system have become a pressing issue which requires immediate resolutions [6] , [7] . In most cases, the efforts have been focused on compliance and planning to deploy advanced anomaly detectors across the critical substations. An integrated security framework has been widely promoted [8] , which includes a comprehensive report from Government Accountability Office (GAO) [9] as well as with critical infrastructure protection (CIP)'s standards from North America Electric Reliability Cooperation (NERC) to ensure protection against advanced persistent threats [10] . Cyberattacks can be orchestrated by the terrorist organization with continued efforts to target on nation's critical cyber assets. The first-ever cyberattack upon power grid has been reported recently with advanced persistent threats [5] .
Successful penetration to a network, e.g., a substation network, is a matter of persistence and time [11] , [12] . A compromised network would further extend attackers' exploration of vulnerabilities within a network that would help them to search for critical control components to plan for an attack [13] , [14] .
One of the targets that may not be detected by defenders is the substation networks [15] , [16] . Eventually, this will lead them to obtain control variables and discover with the ongoing learning of the penetration "tricks" to maximize their disruptive control that could potentially lead to widespread outages [17] .
To describe the behaviors of attackers and how the defenders can respond with remedial strategies, a game-theoretic approach is modeled to enumerate the best-worst strategies between them [18] , [19] . For example, when defenders observe potential attack scenarios [20] , [21] , they will respond to minimize disruption such as potential loss of load and generator tripping [18] . This is to prevent widespread power outages that could lead to a catastrophic blackout. For attackers, they may target on critical devices and estimate the amount of duration so that they can successfully compromise a system before they execute a disruptive plan. This requires a tremendous amount of resources to expedite the search [22] . Although this can be an arduous try-and-error process for the attackers, the continuation of monitoring and discovery by both is a dynamic game problem.
The major contribution of this work is to establish a twoplayer model by incorporating the dynamics of system operation and the status of attackers' footprints and attacks within a power network. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the dynamic game model. Section III and IV formulates the attacker and defender models. Section V integrates the two models into a game tree. Section VI provides simulation results, and the work is concluded in Section VII.
II. DYNAMIC GAME MODEL
This section describes a behavioral model of attackers and defenders [23] . The proposed dynamic game includes intrusive strategies, remedial/preventive actions, and the interaction between the two "players."
A. Attackers' Motive
An initial effort by attackers includes three major steps that would compromise a control network that has direct access to the physical facilities in power systems. There may exist multiple intrusion paths that can be established from external networks to any control networks. A search of access points and intrusion paths is initiated by the persistent agents that can be deployed by multiple entities with available resources as well as agents' strength [11] , [12] . Upon successful intrusion to a local control network, the attackers would learn the existing control functionalities with an attack strategy and plan to maximize their rewards. Learning is a process for attackers to familiarize with the local control environment before they plan and execute cyberattacks. Exploration of other network possibilities might be investigated. To expedite the intrusion attempts, tremendous amount of resources and skilled agents are needed [22] .
The ultimate objective of attackers is to execute control variables to initiate the "ripple-effect" events that can destabilize a power grid, leading to system-wide blackouts. Because electrical devices are protected by cybersecurity protection systems, which include hardware and software to isolate electrical devices from public networks and potential cyberattacks, selecting different cybersecurity protection systems under cyberattacks and determining duration of cyberattacks could result in diverse levels of damages. Specifically, the cost of attackers' efforts would strongly tie to: (1) expected loss of load (ELL) and (2) expected capacity of potential generator tripping (ECGT) (3) cost of conducting cyberattacks. These are integrated into the proposed model with multiplying weights.
B. Defenders' Remedial/Preventive Actions
Situational awareness is crucial to maintain system stability. The defenders at the energy control centers constantly monitor the conditions of their control area. In some cases, control centers may receive irregular events from anomaly detectors across their substations that can be integrated as part of the alarm events before or after the breakers are opened by the attackers. In this game model, the redispatching strategies are considered as a remedial action if an open-breaker attack has been successfully executed. In addition, the dynamic game model for defenders incorporates corrective control actions, i.e., to change power flows of the network to reduce possible loss of load and generation tripping in case of potential successful attack scenarios.
The dynamics of attack occurrence can happen at any time over a period where each period of the operating limits and system loadability can be different. This is often a very challenging task for defenders to redispatch and to maintain system balance because of the operating constraints, such as, ramping rates of generators, lower and upper limits of generators, upper limit of transmission lines. The system transfer capacity may also shrink due to the disconnection of critical devices, e.g., substation(s), from the grid and the defenders may have to consider these possible scenarios to ensure an stable operating condition.
C. Behavioral Interaction Between the Two Players
The action-reaction between attackers and defenders is a series of cause-effect events for each player to optimally reach their goals. Under certain circumstances, the defenders may take precaution to mitigate the risk of potential events when an anomalous event is detected over certain part of the grid. At the same time, this can be discerned by the attackers and they observe the patterns of operating limits. The covert actions and decisions by both of them are the subsequent events, which may repeat based on their observations. The defenders may detect attackers' intrusion to a system and may periodically realize potential adversary. Both attackers and defenders may be able to predict the states of operating conditions by inferring from each of their actions.
To simplify the model, we consider that both players make decisions at discrete epochs, as shown in Fig. 1 . At the decision epoch (DE) t (t = 2, 3, · · · ), the attackers make an action following the defenders' action at the DE (t − 1) (t = 2, 3, · · · ), and the defenders react following the attackers' action at the DE t (t = 1, 2, · · · ). At the first DE, the attackers decide to target on cybersecurity protection systems, whereas the defenders might be vigilant to potential implications by being ready to redispatch the system upon defenders' observations following the attackers' actions for each DE. 11 , and 17 indicates that the attackers have halted their operation mission. The 3 , 9 , and 15 are the defenders' actions following the observed attackers' actions. These actions are related to the path 1 selected by attackers. An increased number of DE is a result of continued attackers-defenders interaction, which indicates ongoing actions when redispatch and attackers' foolprints can be observed. The game tree can be infinite.
Remarks: The following networks are clarified. 1) Substation networks are the networks connecting all equipment in substation perimeters. 2) Control center networks are the networks connecting all remote substation networks under its control area. 3) Power control networks include substation networks and control center networks. 4) External networks denote VPN networks that connect from outside networks to either substations or control centers. 5) Local control networks can be either substations or control centers.
III. MODELING ATTACKERS AND THEIR FOOTPRINTS
This section provides the modeling of attackers with objective function, possible intrusion scenarios, and the associated costs required to penetrate into a network.
A. Objective Function and System Adversary
The attackers' motive and planning, as described in the previous section, is associated with the direct and indirect cost of conducting cyberattacks, the impact cost from loss of load, and the impact cost from generator tripping. The attackers' payoff is expressed as follows.
where (1.a) is the impact cost from loss of load, (1.b) is the impact cost from generator tripping, and (1.c) is the cost of conducting cyberattacks. N t is the number of time periods of conducting cyberattacks, and N t = |Ω t |. F j (·) is the function of the cost caused by conducting cyberattacks as the duration of cyberattacks. If the duration of cyberattacks is too longer but the system is not yet compromised, the attackers tend to halt attacks considering the overall payoff.
In (1), the attackers optimize their payoff by determining the intrusion scenario j and the cyberattacks' duration N t . In addition, the attackers' payoff is also influenced by P D t,k ,j and P G t,k ,j , which are determined by defenders' responses and are modeled in Section IV.
B. Intrusion Scenarios and Successful Attack Scenarios 1) Intrusion Scenarios:
In power systems, electrical devices are protected by specific software/hareware facilities from public networks. For simplification, the software/hareware facilities for protecting a group of electrical devices are called as a cybersecurity protection system. Cyberattackers could conduct attacks on different cybersecurity protection systems. The number of all intrusion scenarios can be enumerated by:
where N CP is the total number of cybersecurity protection systems.
2) Successful Attack Scenarios:
A successful attack scenario is defined that cyberattackers gain access to control electrical devices, which are protected by cybersecurity protection systems. With such privilege, the attackers can execute disruptive operations, e.g., disconnect switches to disable electrical devices. For example, a intrusion scenario includes two cybersecurity protection systems A and B, and there will be three possible successful attack scenarios, i.e., 1) A rather than B is compromised; 2) B rather than A is compromised; 3) A and B are compromised. For each intrusion scenario j with N j cybersecurity protection systems, the total number of successful attack scenarios can be represented as
where
are enumerated as the successful attack scenarios.
C. Probabilities of Successful Attack Scenarios
The probability of the successful attack scenario k under the intrusion scenario j at t can be represented as:
where p t,r,j is the probability that the cybersecurity protection system r is compromised under the intrusion scenario j at t, and it can be expressed as follows.
where F r,j is an increasing function, which denotes the relation between the duration of cyberattacks and the probability of compromising the r-th cybersecurity protection system under the intrusion scenario j, and Δt is the duration of each period. Generally, the longer time of constant intrusion attempts initiated by the persistent attackers implies higher probability of success in network penetration [11] , [12] . Therefore, p t,r,j is considered as a function of the duration of cyberattacks.
IV. MODELING DEFENDERS AND THEIR RESPONSES
This section describes the defenders' reaction to reduce the risks. Overall, the defenders' modeling is quantified with an objective function, i.e., the cost of loss of load and generator tripping, which is subject to operational constraints.
A. Objective Function of System Operation
The defenders expect the minimal cost of loss of load and generator tripping. The defenders' payoff can be expressed as follows.
where (6.a) is the cost from loss of load, and (6.b) is the cost from generator tripping. The parameter C D is the penalty of per MW incurred by loss of load, and it depends on many factors. In practice, this parameter can be obtained based on historical data. For example, NERC Case Notes-Reliability Standard FAC-003-1 [24] and EOP-004-1 [25] show the penalties of some outages. As the defenders' payoff is related to the probability P r t,k ,j , which depends on attackers' actions, the defenders should consider possible attackers' actions when they take actions.
In (6), the variables P D t,k ,j and P G t,k ,j are related to defenders' decision variables, including redispatched power generation, energized load and on/off statuses of generators, which are introduced in the following sections.
In the proposed model, defenders are assumed that they will react to the change of system state as soon as a change of significant system states is realized by attackers. In other words, fast dynamics [26] of cascading outages caused by cyberattackers are not discussed in this manuscript.
B. Loss of Load and Generator Tripping 1) Loss of Load:
For any successful attack scenario k under the intrusion scenario j at a given period t, the loss of load can be expressed as follows.
2) Generator Tripping: Generator tripping may be necessary in order to guarantee the load generation balance in possible successful attack scenarios. For the successful attack scenario k with the intrusion scenario j at the period t, the capacity of tripped generators is expressed as:
C. Operational Constraints
The operational constraints can implicate dispatching between loads and generators, e.g., power imbalance, ramping rates of generators, upper and lower limits of generators, and upper and lower limits of power flows through lines. A change of topological states in a power grid as well as each operating constraint after a possible successful attack should be taken into account. The following constraints are incorporated into the defenders' strategies.
1) Load Generation Balance After Dispatch: After the defenders redispatch the system, power balance at each period should be satisfied.
where (10) ensures Kirchoff's law of each bus after redispatch at t, and (11) shows the relations between phase angles and power flows through lines. It is assumed that reactive power compensation is sufficient and can ensure that voltage magnitude constraints are satisfied when re-dispatching the system. Based on this, DC power flow is used.
2) Load Generation Balance After Successful Attack Scenarios:
If attackers conduct the successful attack scenario k under the intrusion scenario j at t, the topological state of a power grid will change due to unauthorized operations. For the defenders, they should balance the system accordingly to ensure the system stability.
where (12) ensures Kirchoff's law of each bus in the successful attack scenario k under the intrusion scenario j at t, (13) shows the relations between phase angles and power flows through lines.
3) Constraints of Generator Ramping Rates:
While the defenders are dispatching the system, the ramping rate for each generator should be satisfied below.
The constraint (14) indicates that dispatched outputs depend on Ω t , which is determined from the attackers' model. This implies that the actions by the defenders are dependent upon attackers' strategies.
4) Operating Limits for Generators:
When redispatching the system, the generating units should maintain within the limits during each period as follows:
In addition, if attackers conduct the successful attack scenario k under the cyber intrusion scenario j at t, there may implicate the operational limits of a power grid. Under such emergency conditions, the generators' outputs should satisfy the following constraints: (16) where b t,k ,j,g · P min g and b t,k ,j,g · P max g are products to enforce both upper and lower limits to be zeros for tripped generating units. Defenders (the system operators) will adjust the outputs of all generators in order to maintain load generation balance. To avoid violations of operating limits for each unit, the defenders must ensure that all generators meet the following constraints:
where T A is an acceptable time interval, in which the defenders attempt to balance generation and load immediately after successful intrusions. In the worst case when generation and load cannot be balanced within the acceptable time interval, an additional load shedding and generator tripping must be performed.
Equations (17) and (18) denote that the output of all generators should fall within the acceptable adjustment ranges, and this includes the scenarios when certain generators may be tripped.
5) Operating Limits for Loads:
When some components are out of service due to successful attacks, load shedding may be conducted to ensure power balance with the operating constraints. We model each load as a continuous dispatch under the circumstance when some devices have been electrically disconnected in the attack scenario k under intrusion scenario j at the period t.
6) Operating Limits for Transmissions Lines:
Throughout the entire cycle of interaction between attackers and defenders, the fundamentals of operating constraints are the flow limit. The following are the acceptable ranges for each line:
where (20) denotes that power flows through lines should be within limits after generation redispatch at t. (21) denotes power flows through lines should be within limits if cyberattackers conduct the successful attack scenario k under the intrusion scenario j at t.
7) Voltage Limits:
Similarly, the voltage profile should be maintained within an acceptable range:
where (22) means that voltages should be within the limits after generation redispatch at t, (23) denotes that voltages should be within limits if cyberattackers conduct the successful attack scenario k under the intrusion scenario j at t.
V. COMPUTATIONAL CHALLENGE
This section addresses the computational issues of infinite game tree generated by the dynamics of their behavioral interactions between the two players introduced in the last section. Backward induction and size reduction of the game tree are used to generalize a construction of the qualitative and quantitative model that will be solved.
A. Backward Induction Within a Game Tree
The following equations represent backward induction for a dynamic game tree to get the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). This is a nodal transverse between multiple periods to search for an optimal path of the decisions and reactions by both prior the original game tree, which is reduced to a finite version.
where p ∈ {1, 2} denotes two players of the proposed model, i.e., the attackers and the defenders, respectively. 
B. Game Tree Reduction
This section is to convert an infinite model into a finite status using space reduction method. The equations (24) and (25) of backward induction introduced in the previous section may not handle the infinite game tree due to its increasingly dynamical growth in size with strategies from both parties. The other technical challenge is the proposed model of objective functions with the two players are the implicit functions, which may not be viable. As a result, modification of the existing model to handle the infinite cases is necessary. Under an assumption if an ongoing effort of attackers has led to successful attacks in a controlled network with the administrative credentials of the HMI, these ongoing try-and-error trails can be simplified with the determination of uniqueness for each DE of attackers' actions. The existing induction model can be simplified under the assumptions of deterministic attackers' strategies with finite and discrete within the limited periods.
Assuming that the attackers' strategies are SA G 1 = {a 1,1 , · · · , a 1,s , · · · , a 1,S +1 }, the optimal response of the defenders to the attackers can be written below: where a 1,s+1 |a h 2 , s denotes an action of the attackers at the (s+1)-th DE following their observation of what defenders' previous action at the s-th DE. This action is unique and determined by a given SA
Based on the modified recursive method from equations (26) and (27), we can find the optimal response of the defenders at any given action SA G 1 to maximize their objective function in (6) that is subject to the corresponding constraints. Therefore, the function values of the strategies between the two can be obtained based on multiperiod optimization problems. Because discrete strategies of the attackers are finite within a limited horizon, we can achieve the optimal response of the defenders to each discrete strategy of the attackers. Under this case setup, the infinite game tree can be converted.
C. Behavioral Phenomena in Gaming
To ensure a finite and discrete strategy of the attackers, the number of operational periods should be limited. Using the proposed model, if the number of periods for every attack operation exceeds the threshold value N L , it will result in a negative value on the attackers' objective function. This value will gradually reduce with a larger number of attackers' operational periods. It indicates that the optimal duration corresponding to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is smaller than N L .
In this paper, N L can be calculated by using the following method: Assume that the defenders will not react to any intrusion scenarios and calculate the cost of ELL and ECGT with the duration of cyberattacks. Because the probability of compromising systems tends to 1.0, the cost of ELL and ECGT tends to be at the upper limit value as shown in Fig. 3 . On the contrary, the cost of conducting cyberattacks would be increased with a longer duration of cyberattacks. There is an intersection point with the largest abscissa value, which equal N L · Δt.
In summary, the game model is initiated in the following steps.
1) Calculate N L based on the paremeters. Then, based on the successful attack scenarios and its total threshold value of the number of periods N L , determine discrete attackers' strategies. 2) For each attack strategy, equations (6)- (23) are utilized to estimate the defenders' possibly optimal responses. Each attack agent may have unique strategy that leads to successful attack scenarios and the total duration of attack operations. Evaluation is performed individually on a basis of multi-period optimization, which utilizes the proposed mixed integer linear model. 3) The defenders will then respond to each attackers' strategy which can occur at different period of time. This cycle will be evaluated by converting the current infinite game tree into a finite version. Finally, the backward induction using equations (24)- (25) is employed. With the given parameters, the game tree can be established offline and consequently strategies for the defenders can be calculated offline. In real time conditions, the defenders choose strategies based on offline calculations. Therefore, there is no intractable computation issue when the defenders handle cyberattacks. In addition, the offline establishment of the game tree is a series of mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which can be solved by many solvers, i.e., CPLEX and GUROBI.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present simulations conducted using the IEEE 30-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system. The cases are tested in MATLAB 2015a using the CPLEX solver on a personal computer with a 3.1 GHz i5 processor and 8 GB RAM.
A. IEEE 30-Bus System 1) Case Description and Data:
In this section, a generalized IEEE 30-bus test case is employed to validate the proposed model. For the sake of exposition, we focus on the attacks on the transformers T 1 , T 2 , T 3 and T 4 , which represent the transformers at bus 4-12, bus 6-10, bus 6-9, and bus 28-27, respectively. We assume that T 1 , T 2 , T 3 and T 4 are protected by its own cybersecurity protection systems, respectively. The functions F j in (1) and F r,j in (5) use the following expressions. The proposed model and solution are suitable for other expressions.
where c r,j is the coefficient corresponding to the rth transformer with the intrusion scenario j. K j and c NE,j are coefficients of representing the relation between the associated attack cost with respect to time for each intrusion scenario j. Table I shows the coefficients of compromising the system with different intrusion scenarios, K j and c NE,j . C IL , C IG , C IP , C DL and C DG are set to be 1. Δt = 10 min, T A = 10 min, C G = 1000 $/MW, and C L = 4000 $/MW. To achieve the finite discrete decisions for the attackers, the duration of attacks is bound within 60 min, i.e., N L · Δt = 60 min, based on the approach mentioned in the Section V-B. 2) Generate the finite game tree: After the calculation, there is no loss of load even the system is compromised under the intrusion scenarios 1, 2, 4 and 7 in Table I . Therefore, these four scenarios are not considered in the game tree. For the other possible intrusion scenarios, the defenders' optimal response and their payoffs are optimized with (6)- (23) . The finite game tree is shown in Fig. 4 , where the strategy scenarios 1-6, 7-12, 13-18, 19-24, 25-30, 31-36 and 37-42 correspond to the intrusion scenarios 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11, respectively. For example, the strategy scenarios 1 -6 correspond to the cases that the attackers select T 1 and T 4 under attacks, which are terminated at the 2nd-7th decision epochs, respectively. For these scenarios, the strategy scenarios 1 and 2 have the same actions in the 1st period, and the strategy scenarios 3 and 5 also have the same actions in the 1st period.
3) Achieve SPNE using backward induction: Based on the finite game tree and the corresponding payoffs, the SPNE can be achieved using the backward induction method, i.e., (24) and (25) , shown in Fig. 4 . The SPNE of the proposed model corresponds to the strategy scenario 2, which is highlighted in the Fig. 4 . The corresponding attackers' strategy is to perform cyberattacks on T 1 and T 4 simultaneously, and terminate cyberattacks at the 3rd DE if the system has not yet been compromised by them. The corresponding defenders' strategy is shown in Table II . The objectives of the defenders and the attackers are −$8,040 and $7,850, respectively.
The dynamics between the attackers and the defenders are described as follows. At the first decision epoch, the attackers conduct cyberattacks on the transformers T 1 and T 4 simultaneously. To reduce possible loss of loads and tripped generators after possible successful attack scenarios, the defenders dispatch generators' outputs to 0.9, 0.19, 0.15, 0.31, 0.25 and 1.034. At the second decision epoch, the attackers continue to cyberattacks on the transformers T 1 and T 4 if the system has not been compromised by them, and the defenders dispatch generators' outputs to 0.9, 0.25, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3 and 0.934. At the third decision epoch, the attackers would terminate cyberattacks on T 1 and T 4 if the system has not been compromised by them. 4) Sensitivity Analysis: Fig. 5(a) shows the strategy scenarios corresponding to SPNEs with different values of c NE,j and K j . The results show that different parameters result in different optimal strategies corresponding to SPNEs. The strategy scenario 25 accounts for about 84%, and the strategy scenario 2 accounts for about 16%. The strategy scenario 25 corresponds to cyberattacks on T 1 , T 3 and T 4 , and the strategy scenario 2 corresponds to cyberattacks on T 1 and T 4 . Fig. 5(b) shows the costs of ELL and ECTG of different intrusion scenarios with different decision epoches. The intrusion scenario 9, i.e., attacks on T 1 , T 3 and T 4 , has the largest cost of ELL and ECTG. So, the strategy scenario 25 corresponding to SPNEs accounts for a large percentage. Though the intrusion scenario 3, i.e., attacks on T 1 and T 4 , does not result in the largest cost of ELL and ECTG, the dynamic game between defenders and attackers drive the strategy scenario 2 into a SPNE under certain conditions. In general, the attackers tend to conduct cyberattacks causing a larger cost of ELL and ECTG, while the specific strategies should be obtained with the proposed model. 
B. IEEE 118-Bus System 1) Case Description and Data:
The IEEE 118-bus system contains 19 generators, 177 transmission lines, 9 transformers and 91 loads. Fig. 6 shows the system topology. The data for the system can be found in [27] . The ramping rate of each generator 7 , T 8 , and T 9 . In this case, there are 511 scenarios of cyberattacks on substation combinations, which include 1-transformer to 9-transformer combination cyberattacks. The parameters c r,j for 1-transformer to 9-transformer combi- 2) Simulation Results: For 511 scenarios of cyberattacks on transformer combinations with different decision epochs, the game tree with payoffs can be established by using (6)- (23) . Then, by using the backward induction method, i.e., (24) and (25) , the strategies corresponding to the SPNE of the proposed model can be obtained. The attackers' strategy corresponding to the SPNE is to conduct cyberattacks on T 1 , and terminate cyberattacks at the second decision epoch. The defenders' strategies corresponding to the SPNE are shown in Table III . When the attackers choose intrusion scenarios (their strategies), they should consider the probability of successful attack scenarios and the damages caused by successful attack scenarios. Fig. 7 shows the costs of ELL and ECTG of different intrusion scenarios (transformer combinations) with different decision epochs. Even though successful attack scenarios with more transformers may cause larger loss of load and tripped generators, the costs of ELL and ECTG may be lower due to smaller probabilities of successful attack scenarios. For example, the blue line with asterisks denotes the costs when the intrusion scenario includes T 1 , and the red line with diamonds denotes the costs when the intrusion scenario includes T 1 and T 3 simultaneously.
The defenders' objective is to reduce the possible damages by generation redispatch following attakers' strategies. As shown in Fig. 6 , real power from G 1 at bus 10 is delivered to the network through the transformer T 1 and the line 8-30. Once the transformer T 1 is disabled by the attackers, the generator G 1 may be tripped associated with load shedding due to upper limits of the transmission line 8-30. So, under the intrusion scenario including T 1 , the defenders redispatch outputs of generators to reduce potential damages. Peculiarly, the output of G 1 is reduced with the maximum ramping rate at the first decision epoch.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The proposed dynamic game model determines the preventive strategies for the defenders to mitigate the risk of power outages when a power grid is under attack. For the proposed model, the defenders take fully into account possible sequential actions performed by the attackers. When the defenders make sequential and repeated decisions, the constraints, i.e., power balance, ramping rates of generators, upper and lower limits of generators, upper and lower limits of power flows on lines, are satisfied. In addition, the changed system topology and the corresponding operating constraints after being potentially compromised by the attackers are also taken into account. The dynamic model is formulated as a mixed integer linear programming model. While the game tree of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) can be infinite, a space reduction approach is employed to transform the original infinite tree into a finite one. Then, the backward induction is used to solve the finite game tree to get the SPNE. Case studies validate the proposed method to demonstrate its feasibility. The proposed model assumed that the information of both players can be observed that will affect their next actions. Future work will focus on the limited observation of actions by attackers and the possible remediation based on the incomplete information.
